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In recent months, Moscow oblast has seen a series of social protests against environmental 
problems caused by municipal waste landfills. The waste disposal sites are overloaded, lack 
adequate safeguards, emit toxic gases and contaminate the groundwater with harmful efflu-
ent. The situation is most severe in Moscow oblast because the capital city generates the larg-
est volumes of waste; however, the problem itself extends beyond environmental concerns 
into the economic and social spheres. Waste management in Russia is marked by notorious 
overloading of legal waste disposal sites and the emergence of illegal waste dumps, inade-
quate waste disposal practices leading to air pollution and groundwater contamination which 
affect local residents, and bad practices by businesses with links to President Vladimir Putin 
which have monopolised the waste collection sector.
The worsening environmental problems, and especially the health conditions suffered by res-
idents exposed to waste dump vapours, have triggered social discontent. Residents of many 
locations outside Moscow have been protesting for months, and in some cases have raised 
political demands. However, a closer analysis of how the protests in Russia unfolded (and sub-
sided) offers little hope that they will bring about any systemic change in waste management 
or create long-term social effects such as the emergence of mechanisms for civic oversight or 
a gradual change in the relationship between the state and the citizens. The ‘garbage protests’ 
seem to be an accurate illustration of the general dynamics of social protests in Russia. These 
are usually spontaneous and local, focus on a specific problem, and peter out once the prob-
lem has been even partly addressed, when the people become tired of demonstrating or come 
under pressure from the authorities. Moreover, the protesters seldom see their problem as 
part of a wider system sanctioned by the top tiers of government. The most that they expect 
is for their petition to reach the ‘good tsar’ president and for the local problem to be solved, 
without affecting the system as a whole. This attitude allows the Kremlin to maintain its status 
as the sole decision-maker, and gives it broad possibilities to extinguish the protests by making 
small concessions, manipulating the protesters, or intimidating or bribing their leaders.
Moscow in the ‘golden ring’ of landfills
2017 was proclaimed the Year of Ecology in Rus-
sia, but unfortunately it also saw the emergence 
of a range of environmental pollution scandals 
connected to the waste disposal sites. The topic 
was publicised during President Putin’s televised 
conference with the public in June 2017, when 
a resident of Balashikha near Moscow complained 
about a massive landfill located just next to the 
residential areas and its detrimental impact on 
the people’s health. The President decided that 
the site should be closed with immediate effect, 
and his decision was carried out. However, that 
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failed to solve the systemic problem of waste 
disposal because the waste from Balashikha 
was merely redirected to another site near 
Volokolamsk, exacerbating the problems and 
sparking protests there.
Moscow oblast is the third most densely pop-
ulated region in Russia; it is part of the Mos-
cow agglomeration and a popular location for 
suburban residences and summer houses, some 
owned by members of the Russian elite (such 
as the villa district of Rublovka, the summer 
house neighbourhoods of FSB functionaries 
and others). It is also bottom of the environ-
mental ratings; in a recent survey it ranked 83rd 
out of 85 Russian regions (while Moscow itself 
ranked 23rd)1. Apart from its own litter (3–4 mil-
lion tonnes), the oblast receives twice as much 
waste from the Moscow City (8 million tonnes). 
Even though on average Muscovites generate 
twice as much waste as residents of other ar-
eas, the policy of the Moscow city authorities 
has been limited to ‘exporting’ waste outside 
the city limits2. As a result Moscow oblast, in-
habited by 5% of the Russian population, has 
had to absorb 20% of the total waste generat-
ed in Russia. On top of that, only half of indus-
trial waste and a mere 1% of municipal waste 
is processed3. According to Sergei Ivanov, the 
presidential plenipotentiary for ecology, Russia 
processes between 7% and 10% of waste on 
average, while the rest is put into landfill with-
out any processing or adequate safeguards. 
According to official figures, fifteen large land-
fills are operating in Moscow oblast, as well as 
1 Environmental ranking by the Green Patrol organi-
sation, 1st quarter of 2018, http://greenpatrol.ru/ru/
stranica-dlya-obshchego-reytinga/ekologicheskiy-reyt-
ing-subektov-rf?tid=343
2 К. Руков, Мусорный бунт: За что Москве должно быть 
стыдно, “The Village”, 16 February 2018, https://www.
the-village.ru/village/city/infrastructure/301663-mu-
sor-che-s-nim-proihodit 
3 Свалки в Подмосковье, http://www.msknov.ru/im-
portant /JEkologiya_i_radiatsiya/Svalki_v_Podmosk-
ove/; С. Сарджвеладзе, Игорь Ротенберг взялся за 
отходы, 4 June 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/newspa-
per/2018/06/05/5b15229b9a79471f284ea171
a difficult-to-estimate number of smaller sites, 
some of which are illegal. In recent years, 24 
large landfills have officially been closed, but 
some of them reportedly continue operating4.
One of the main problems plaguing landfills in 
Russia concerns overloading; they accept waste 
in volumes far exceeding their prescribed limits. 
Many landfills were created back in the Soviet 
times, and are unsuited to absorb the volumes 
of waste generated by today’s society. On aver-
age, they take in twice as much waste as they are 
designed for, as even the authorities have ad-
mitted5. The problem has been exacerbated by 
the way the city of Moscow manages its waste; 
because of the high cost of disposing waste in 
landfills capable of cleaning up and removing 
biogas (such as Timokhovo), waste gets sent to 
other landfills which are technologically less ad-
vanced but offer lower prices. It is a common 
practice to bring excessive amounts of waste to 
landfills at night under the cover of darkness. 
Another problem concerns insufficient safe-
guards at landfills, i.e. inadequate insulation, 
no systems to capture and purify effluents, and 
the absence of protective layers of soil between 
layers of waste. As a result, the landfills emit 
toxic gases and effluents contaminate aqui-
4 Б. Ляув, Е. Брызгалова, Почему Московская область 
задыхается от вони со свалок, “Ведомости”, 
16 April 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/realty/arti-
cles/2018/04/16/766756-moskovskaya-oblast-voni-svalok
5 Including Alexander Kogan, the Moscow oblast’s 
minister for ecology. Короли мусора и новостроек: 
как бизнес и подмосковные ОПГ богатели в эпоху 
Воробьева, TV Dozhd, 14 June 2018, https://tvrain.ru/
teleshow/reportazh/telegina_vorobev-465656
Moscow oblast is bottom of the environ-
mental ratings – it ranks 83rd out of 85 
Russian regions; apart from its own litter 
(3–4 million tonnes), the oblast receives 
twice as much waste from the Moscow 
City (8 million tonnes).
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fers6. In some landfills, even hazardous medi-
cal waste or radioactive materials are disposed 
of7. Moreover, there exist so-called ‘wild’ waste 
dumps which are unregulated and do not com-
ply with any rules; according to Sergey Donskoy, 
the minister for natural resources, 153,000 such 
illegal waste disposal sites were discovered in 
Russia in 2016 alone8. Because of the intensive 
truck traffic on access roads to landfills and 
the long queues, some drivers choose to dump 
their cargo in the nearby forests. The condi-
tion of the environment around many land-
fills verges on environmental disaster. Accord-
ing to studies, the concentrations of chemical 
substances (especially hydrogen sulphide) in 
the air and groundwater exceed the permitted 
limits by several times, while the data official-
ly published by the authorities understates the 
problem9. The most problematic landfills that 
have caused the biggest resident protests are 
located in Moscow oblast: they include Yadrovo 
near Volokolamsk, the temporary landfill in the 
village of Sichovo near Ruza (within 500m of 
a school and oligocene water wells providing 
drinking water for the entire area), Zavolenye 
in Kurovskoye (which has been receiving waste 
again even though it was closed down in 2016), 
as well as landfills near Klin, Kolomna, Dmitrov 
and Serpukhov. Some highly problematic land-
6 К. Назарова, Новая свалка около Волоколамска. 
Власти при поддержке ОМОНа ответили жителям 
на протесты, TV Dozhd 17, May 2018, https://tvrain.
ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/novaja_svalka_okolo_vo-
lokolamska-463936/
7 Е. Самедова, Противники полигона «Ядрово» требуют 
отставки губернатора Подмосковья, “Deutsche Welle”, 
27 May 2018; Жители Сычево перекрыли дорогу, 
чтобы не  пустить грузовики с  ртутью, znak.com, 
12 July 2018.
8 В. Иноземцев, Как решить мусорную проблему 
в Подмосковье, 26.03.2018, https://www.rbc.ru/news-
paper/2018/03/27/5ab8af559a79472cb7ddbcde
9 Противники полигона “Ядрово”... op.cit. According to 
alarmed residents, the authorities have been under-re-
porting hydrogen sulphide concentrations in the offi-
cial figures: according to official data, in March the limit 
was exceeded tenfold, while according to measurements 
made by residents, the concentration was 90 times high-
er than permitted. Е. Брызгалова, Каждый третий 
житель Волоколамска вышел на митинг против свалки, 
“Ведомости”, 1 April 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/
politics/articles/2018/04/01/755513-miting-protiv-svalki
fills are also located in other regions of Russia, 
e.g. Skokovo in Yaroslavl oblast (the region also 
imports large amounts of waste from Moscow), 
Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad oblast, Yakutia and 
others.
The authorities of Moscow and Moscow oblast 
have partly responded to the garbage prob-
lem by planning to build waste incinerators 
and waste sorting plants. Ten waste inciner-
ators and eight sorting plants are expected 
to be constructed in Moscow oblast, includ-
ing in Klin, Mozhaysk, Kolomna, Dmitrov and 
Volokolamsk. The authorities are also planning 
to revitalise existing landfills; revitalisation is 
currently underway in Kashira, Elektrostal and 
Pavlov Posad, and is set to begin in seven other 
landfills in 2019.
However, getting businesses and especially 
households to sort waste still poses the great-
est challenge in Russia. The issue has been ad-
dressed in a bill on waste disposal which was 
amended in December 201710. The bill intro-
duced mechanisms to incentivise businesses 
and households to sort their waste; imposed 
a requirement to carry out public consultations 
concerning the locations of landfills, incinera-
tors and sorting plants; put local governments 
in charge of landfill maintenance; and intro-
duced a waste disposal fee for industrial plants 
and an ecological charge for citizens. However, 
as a result of the lobbying efforts by businesses 
and the people’s unwillingness to bear addi-
tional costs in times of crisis, the implementa-
tion of the new rules, concerning charges has 
10 The text of the bill is available at http://www.kremlin.ru/
acts/bank/42728/page/1 
Russia processes between 7% and 10% 
of waste, while the rest is put into landfill 
without any processing or adequate safe-
guards. The situation around many land-
fills verges on environmental disaster.
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been postponed until 1 January 2019. President 
Putin has also spoken about the need to put 
the landfill situation in order. In this year’s ad-
dress to parliament, he stressed that there were 
22,000 landfills in Russia, and the problems 
generated by them needed to be resolved, first 
and foremost by cleaning up and revitalising 
the landfills located within cities11. 
Pecunia non olet:  
the lucrative garbage business
Meanwhile, waste storage and disposal are 
a lucrative business. In Moscow and Moscow 
oblast under the mayor Sergei Sobanin’s rule, 
the waste sector has become almost entirely 
monopolised by businesses controlled by mem-
bers of the ruling elite, including people with 
close links to President Putin. The ‘king’ of the 
garbage business in Moscow is Igor Chaika, son 
of the Russian prosecutor general: in 2015 his 
company Khartia won two fifteen-year contracts 
for waste disposal in Moscow worth a total of 
42.6 billion roubles ($635 million; all conver-
sions based on the exchange rate from August 
2018), in 2016 it was awarded further contracts 
worth 220 million roubles ($3.3 million), and 
in 2017 more deals worth 182 million roubles 
($2.7 million)12. Other important players in the 
waste business include Roman Abramovich, 
the oligarch co-financing the Kremlin’s projects 
(via his company MKM-Logistics which has won 
a tender worth 40 billion roubles ($600 million); 
the company is co-owned by Oleg Gref, son of 
the CEO of Sberbank), Gennady Timchenko, 
Putin’s friend and oil trader (the Ecoline com-
pany, 25.6 billion roubles, i.e. $382 million) and 
the CEO of Rostec Sergey Chemezov (12.4 bil-
lion roubles, i.e. $185 million), another close ac-
quaintance of the president.
11 Transcript of President Putin’s address on 1 March 2018: 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 
12 See among others Л. Соболь, Абрамович, Тимченко 
и  сын Генпрокурора Чайки, ФБК, 26 August 2015, 
https://fbk.info/investigations/post/88/
In April this year the city of Moscow conclud-
ed a tendering procedure for the removal of 
waste to landfills in Moscow oblast for anoth-
er ten years, worth a total of more than 190 
billion roubles ($2.8 billion). The biggest ben-
eficiaries included RT-Invest, a Rostec subsidi-
ary (winning contracts worth a total of 109 bil-
lion roubles, i.e. $1.6 billion) and Igor Chaika’s 
Khartia (35 billion roubles, i.e. $522 million)13. 
The contracts are highly profitable: the compa-
nies charge between 2000 and 3000 roubles 
($30–45) to collect one tonne of waste in Mos-
cow, and pay a mere 600 to 800 roubles ($9–12) 
to the landfill managers14. Importantly, local 
governments in Moscow oblast are now re-
quired to conclude ten-year waste disposal con-
tracts with the tender winner assigned to their 
location, while previously around 300 waste 
disposal companies had operated, and local 
governments, private individuals and landfills 
were free to select with whom to co-operate.
Many of the landfills themselves, according to 
investigative journalists’ reports, are controlled 
by criminal groups. The landfills in Lesnaya 
(the second largest in Moscow oblast) and Al-
eksinsky are controlled by the notorious organ-
ised crime leader Nikolai Nefedov (aka Nefed) 
and the dubious Foundation for the Support of 
War Veterans15. The foundation is also linked 
13 Khartia also operates in other regions: in 2018 it estab-
lished itself as a monopoly in the waste disposal sector 
in Yaroslavl and Tula oblasts. For more information, see 
Б. Ляув, Е. Брызгалова, Мусор Подмосковья вывезут 
компании «Ростеха» и Игоря Чайки, “Ведомости” 
23 April 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/arti-
cles/2018/04/23/767604-musor 
14 Короли мусора и новостроек... , op.cit.
15 Ibidem.
Waste storage and disposal are a lucrative 
business. It has become almost entirely 
monopolised by businesses controlled by 
people with close links to President Putin.
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to the entrepreneur Pyotr Katsyv, the former 
minister for transport of Moscow oblast and 
the deputy CEO of Russian Railways, who has 
been included in the US sanctions list (the so-
called Magnitsky List). The Kuchino landfill in 
Balashikha, which President Putin ordered to be 
closed, was controlled by Anatoly Petrov (aka 
Petrukha), a member of the criminal world who 
allied with the town’s mayor Evgeny Zhirkov; 
the media have published recordings of Zhirk-
ov’s meetings with Petrov where the two men 
discussed extorting money from local entre-
preneurs and sharing profits16. The Kulakovsky 
landfill in the town of Chekhov is reported-
ly controlled by organised crime group based 
in Podolsk17.
The programme for the construction of waste 
incinerators and sorting plants in Moscow 
oblast has also been controlled by businesses 
with close links to the Kremlin. Ten incinerators 
are planned to be constructed in the oblast, 
and four projects are already in the prepara-
tory stage. RT-Invest, the company mentioned 
above, will be the main contractor building the 
facilities (the construction of each project will 
cost 31 billion roubles, i.e. $463 million), while 
Trest Gidromontazh – owned by Igor Roten-
berg, the son of President Putin’s close friend 
– will be a subcontractor18.
Protests by ‘ordinary’ people
The environmental and health problems caused 
by the landfills have galvanised protests by 
residents of Moscow oblast. People who have 
hitherto not sympathised with the opposition 
or participated in demonstrations are now tak-
16 See Мэр подмосковной Балашихи рассказал, как раздает 
откаты и забирает местный бизнес, 30 January 2017, 
https://crimerussia.com/corruption/mer-podmoskovnoy- 
balashikhi-rasskazal-kak-razdaet-otkaty-i-zabiraet-mest-
nyy-biznes/
17 К. Руков, Мусорный бунт, op.cit.
18 С. Сарджавеладзе, Компания Ротенберга стала 
подрядчиком «мусорного» проекта «Ростеха», rbc.ru, 
4 June 2018, www.rbc.ru/politics/04/06/2018/5b15229 
b9a79471f284ea171 
ing to the streets. The protests were sparked by 
the dramatic situation in Volokolamsk, a town 
of 20,000 inhabitants located 120 kilometres 
from Moscow. In March this year, 57 children 
(or according to other sources, more than 200) 
were admitted to hospital with symptoms of 
poisoning by gas vapours from the nearby land-
fill, which triggered a spontaneous protest by 
parents and other residents. The people were 
further angered by the official medical reports 
which claimed that no poisoning had taken 
place. 
Regular protests took place in the town in the 
months that followed. In some cases, they 
turned violent: in March, outraged parents of 
the hospitalised children roughed up Evgeny 
Gavrilov, the head of Volokolamsk district, in-
sulted Andrei Vorobyov, the governor of Mos-
cow oblast, and hit him with snowballs; while 
in May, shots were fired at one of the garbage 
trucks heading towards the landfill.
The protests have been joined by a significant 
proportion of the residents; the largest one in 
Volokolamsk was attended by a third of the 
town’s population (7000 out of 20,000 peo-
ple), while the rally on 3 March brought to-
gether 5000 people, and the one on 29 March 
6000 people19. Several hundred-strong protests 
were also staged in Balashikha, Kolomna, Klin, 
Sergiev Posad, Tuchkov and Serpukhov, as well 
as in Yaroslavl oblast, which has been the final 
19 Е. Брызгалова, Каждый третий житель Волоколамска 
вышел на митинг против свалки, “Ведомости”, 
1 April 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/ 
2018/04/01/755513-miting-protiv-svalki
The environmental and health problems 
caused by the landfills have galvanised 
protests by residents of Moscow oblast. 
People who have never sympathised with 
the opposition or participated in demon-
strations are now taking to the streets.
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destination for a significant portion of Mos-
cow’s waste in recent years. The preferred form 
of protest often consists in blocking landfill ac-
cess roads. The protest communities now have 
leaders, the Volokolamsk entrepreneur Andrei 
Zhdanov being the most recognisable one. Act-
ing on a request from the residents, the town 
councillors of Volokolamsk have decided to 
hold a referendum on the closure of the landfill 
in September.
In addition to staging protests, the residents 
have been monitoring the quantities of land-
filled waste and information about plans to 
build new landfills, they have commissioned 
local environmental studies, operated informa-
tive profiles on Telegram, vKontakte and other 
social media portals, and produced thematic 
t-shirts and car stickers. The protests now also 
have both a symbol and a ‘mascot’ – a ten-year 
old girl who threatened Governor Vorobyov 
with a meaningful gesture during his speech 
at one of the rallies. In some cases, individual 
opposition activists have joined the protest-
ing residents, including representatives of the 
Communists, the Yabloko party, activists from 
the radical Left Front of Sergei Udaltsov, aides 
of Aleksei Navalny, and members of the unreg-
istered Libertarian Party. Ksenia Sobchak, who 
was then a presidential candidate, took part 
in the rallies on 10 and 21 March. The protests 
were also backed by several representatives of 
the local authorities, including the mayor of 
Volokolamsk Pyotr Lazarev, of the Communist 
Party, and the head of Serpukhov district Alex-
ander Shestun. However, apolitical local resi-
dents still constitute the core of the protests. 
Even though most of them have distanced 
themselves from politics, in some cases political 
demands have been raised nonetheless; for ex-
ample, Governor Vorobyov has been called on 
to resign, and demands for the reinstatement 
of direct elections of mayors have been raised. 
During the demonstrations, the protester held 
banners which said ‘Trash Vorobyov’, ‘Crimea 
got a bridge, we got a graveyard’, ‘The govern-
ment is as toxic as the landfills’. The slogans at-
tacking the governor are particularly important 
in the context of Vorobyov’s bid for re-election 
this September. However, even more common 
were slogans calling on President Putin as the 
‘last resort’, which referred to his image as 
a politician who cares about the ordinary peo-
ple, and to his decision to immediately close the 
Balashikha landfill last year. 
The protests, which have already lasted for 
several months, have posed a significant chal-
lenge to the authorities, especially the regional 
government. Predictably, they have resorted to 
methods tested on many previous occasions at 
the federal and local level, such as pressurising 
the leaders and activists, the use of force during 
demonstrations, pretending to make conces-
sions, and employing propaganda. The demon-
strations have been secured by the OMON, 
which has intervened brutally in some cases 
(especially where access roads were blocked), 
dispersed the crowd and removed the most 
active protesters (including women and sen-
iors). Protest leaders have been detained and 
arrested: following the protest on 1 April, ten 
activists were detained and the leaders, Andrei 
Zhdanov and Artyom Lubimov, were arrested 
for 15 days. Law enforcement agencies, includ-
ing the Moscow branch of the Interior Ministry’s 
department for the prosecution of economic 
crimes and the immigration service, undertook 
inspections at the companies of Zhdanov, an-
other Volokolamsk activist Ramzan Bayramov 
and their business partners. Alexander Shestun, 
the head of Serpukhov district, has been held 
in a high-security detention facility since June 
The protests are a challenge to the au-
thorities – they resort to pressurising the 
leaders and activists, the use of force 
during demonstrations, making apparent 
concessions and employing propaganda.
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on charges of abuse of power. Inspections have 
also been carried out at the offices of the Vo-
lokolamsk mayor Lazarev, and the man himself 
has been summoned as a witness in an embez-
zlement case and had his apartment searched.
The regional government has also made some 
token concessions, designed not so much to al-
leviate the situation as to create an appearance 
that the authorities are concerned, and to dis-
tract the protesters. After the protests started 
in March, Moscow oblast’s governor Vorobyov 
dismissed the head of Volokolamsk district and 
imposed a state of emergency at the landfill 
(which nonetheless continued to accept waste). 
The governor also pledged to send his plenipo-
tentiary to the town and install a screen to dis-
play air quality monitoring results. At the same 
time the government has supressed informa-
tion about the protests: the two largest state-
owned television stations refused to cover the 
most vocal protest in Volokolamsk that fol-
lowed the children’s poisoning. In some other 
cases, coverage of the stories was presented at 
the end of news shows and was dominated by 
long statements by the governor. Some news 
channels implied that the protests had been 
inspired by external agents who sought to fan 
a conflict between the residents and the gover-
nor, as allegedly evidenced by Ksenia Sobchak’s 
visits and the interest in the developments 
at Volokolamsk shown by Aleksei Navalny20.
Russian protests and their limitations
The landfill protests are another instance of 
social discontent to have surfaced in recent 
years, proving that after a period of social 
apathy and public consolidation around the 
Kremlin following the annexation of Crimea, 
people are becoming increasingly frustrated by 
the deteriorating economic situation. The first 
such large-scale expression of discontent was 
the truck drivers’ protest against road charges 
20 А. Перцев, Что рассказал Волоколамск об эволюции 
российской вертикали, carnegie.ru, 23.03.2018, https://
carnegie.ru/commentary/75870
(the Platon system) in late 2015 – which spanned 
40 regions in Russia, was joined by thousands 
of road hauliers and continued for more than 
a year. In the months that followed, different 
cities in Russia saw protests by farmers, teach-
ers, opponents of the demolition of 1960s-era 
blocks of flats and resettlements, victims of 
fraud by developer companies and fraudulent 
banks, people protesting against increasing the 
retirement age, and political demonstrations 
organised by Navalny. 
Protests have resumed because the memory of 
the government’s brutal reaction to the 2011–12 
demonstrations has faded and social problems 
have accumulated. Russians have been made 
to bear the costs of their government’s foreign 
policy sanctions, restrictions on food imports, 
etc. Organising protests is undoubtedly easier 
now thanks to new technologies, especially 
with regard to the ability to co-ordinate efforts 
and look for allies online. However, a number 
of factors in Russia still undermine the potential 
of the protests, many of them related to the 
specific social and political culture in Russia. 
The protests are usually local and insular, spon-
taneous and time-limited; they subside quickly 
and do not transform into more durable insti-
tutionalised formulas such as mechanisms for 
civic oversight of various spheres of public life. 
The potential of the protests is also affected by 
the weakness of the organisers (e.g. trade un-
ions) and their pliancy in relations with the au-
thorities, as well as the weak solidarity and lack 
of co-ordination between the different protest 
The protests are usually local, spontane-
ous and time-limited. Society adopts the 
‘supplicant’ attitude vis-a-vis the Kremlin, 
therefore the government has broad pos-
sibilities to extinguish protests by making 
symbolic concessions and intimidating 
or bribing their leaders.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 283 8
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak 
Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska 
TRANSLATION: OSW 
CO-OPERATION: Jim Todd 
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski, Wojciech Mańkowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
groups, which often treat one another as rivals 
competing for the state’s assistance21. Moreo-
ver, the protest groups do not expect systemic 
changes, but merely a local solution that will 
meet their expectations, and they are satisfied 
when their demands are even partly met. The 
citizens expressing their discontent are seldom 
willing to assume part of the responsibility for 
the given sphere; for instance the landfill protest-
ers oppose landfills as well as incinerators, and 
are unwilling to pay the costs of implementing 
a household waste sorting system. Finally, peo-
ple in Russia have little faith that social pressure 
can be effective or that they could engage in 
a dialogue with the government on an equal 
footing. The government, and President Putin 
in particular, are seen as the only actors with 
any agency and ability to solve problems, while 
society is entirely disempowered and reduced 
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to the role of a supplicant appealing to the 
President’s good will. Presenting a humble pe-
tition to the ‘good tsar’, e.g. by dialling the tel-
evision hotline during the President’s dialogue 
with the nation, is considered to be a more 
effective method of protecting one’s interests 
than protesting. By adopting this ‘supplicant’ 
attitude, the people offer the Kremlin broad 
possibilities to extinguish protests: by making 
partial or symbolic concessions, manipulating 
the protesters, or intimidating or bribing their 
leaders. Bearing these entrenched limitations in 
mind, it is likely that even a problem as acute as 
the impact of landfills on people’s health will 
not lead to any change in Russia’s waste man-
agement system or any lasting social activisa-
tion in the sphere of environmental protection, 
and despite their original dynamics, the pro-
tests will gradually subside.
